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THE EARLIER part of this study' was written in an effort to describe
the economic and legal background of modern trade association activities,
and to analyze the impact of the anti-trust laws on the program of the
Sugar Institute, a typical trade association whose affairs had recently
been canvassed in the Supreme Court.2 Since that article was written,
the Robinson-Patman Act has been passed.a The Act has created new
areas of doubt in the law of price discrimination, and it has been claimed
that it will substantially change the application of the Sugar Institute
decisions, and of the anti-trust laws in general, to trade associations,
perhaps even to the extent of requiring the kind of price uniformities
which have previously been attacked as restraints of trade. However,
although the new Act is so ambiguous that it may be construed to change
the anti-trust laws as to combinations, one can hardly assume that a
basic change in the law restated in the Sugar Institute case was intended
or made by the Rbbinson-Patman Act. While more than ordinary cau-
tion and foresight will be needed in the administratioi and interpretation
of the new Act to prevent an unobtrusive nullificatioh of some important
features of the Sugar Institute decisions, it is most unlikely that either
the Federal Trade Commission or the courts will countenance the use of
the new statute to justify substantial restraints and monopolistic practices
by trade associations. This article will not undertake a systematic or
inclusive analysis of the Robinsbn-Paitman Act, but an effort will be
made, in discussing the specific restraints involved in the Sugar Institute
t General Solicitor, Tennessee Valley Authority, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General in the trial of the Sugar Institute case.
1. Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trist Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar
Institute Decisions: I. (1936) 45 YALE L. .". 1339.
2. United States v. Sugar Institute, 297 O. S. 553 (1936), aff'g, 15 F. Supp. 817
(S. D. N.Y. 1934). For further discussion of the Sugar Institute decisions and their
background, see also Mermin, Sugar: A Rugged Collectivist (1936) 21 ILl. L. Rav.
320.
3. Pub. L. No. 692, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 19, 1936). The statute is composed
of four sections: Section 1, which has six subsections, is an amendment to § 2 of the
Clayton Act [38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S. C. § 13 (1934)] and is enforced by the
same sanctions as § 2, unamended. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act is a tempo-
rary provision designed merely to make the Act applicable to the Goodyear case.
Section 3 provides criminal penalties for commission of enumerated prohibited acts.
Section 4 is applicable only to "cooperative association(s)" and expressly permits them
to return to "members, producers, or consumers, the whole, or any part of, the net
earnings or surplus resulting from their trading operations." In this article the main
interest will be with § 1 of the Act and all references to it will be by Section number.
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case, to consider the extent to which the new statute may alter the appli-
cation of the anti-trust laws to trade practices such as those of the Sugar
Institute.
Freight Rates. The allocation of freight charges between purchaser and
refiner, a keenly competitive aspect of sugar marketing, gave rise to one
of the most bitterly contested issues of the Suegar Institute case. Tradi-
tional practice was to charge purchasers arbitrarily a given amount, called
a freight application, for transportation of sugar to them. Occasionally
this application was the actual freight rate from the nearest basing
(refinery) point. Traditionally, the refiners had used all refinery points
as bases, and customers were permitted to purchase f. o. b. refinery when
they so desired. Shipments were made by rail, by water, by truck, or by
a combination of these facilities. The arbitrary freight application pre-
vailing in a given vicinity usually bore some relation to one of the corre-
sponding actual rates from the basing point. The problem of the refiner
was not only to stabilize ultimate price, of which freight is an important
part, but also to keep the prevailing application as nearly as possible at
the rail rate, as distinguished from the rates by alternative routes.
Obviously, the distributing trade paying an application higher than
the actual freight rate is restless. The distributor who manages to avoid
the high application and effects economies in his transportation costs'
can reduce his prices, and spread his trade at the expense of his com-
petitors. The competitors complain. The inevitable tendency in such a
situation is to break down the producer's price structure to the point
where the lowest available freight application rate prevails as to all sugar
delivered in that general vicinity. Thus, the purchaser who has shipping
and storage facilities and the natural economic advantages of location on
the waterways is deprived of the benefit of his situation. Instability of
prices is inherent. Competitive pressure from the purchasing side of the
market is unceasing.
The responses of the individual refiners to this pressure took several
forms. The anxiety of the Institute was to eliminate every concession
resulting from this situation and to maintain as rigidly as possible the
all-rail rate on most of the sugar moving into the affected ireas, including
that moved by water.
The first device established to this end was the Code provision 3(c),
condemning in the name of non-discriminatioh "the use of differential
rates on consignments or otherwise than on direct shipments over dif-
ferential routes as customers' request."
Code 3 (c) was supplemented by an "interpretation" reading as follows:
"GENERAL USE oF DIFFERENTIAL RouTEs
Absorbing freight means the selling of transportation at less than
cost, which is unsound in principle and necessarily throws an undue
1936] 29
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burden on the consumers at and near the primary markets. It is
realized, however, that the use of differential rates on consignments
cannot be prevented in all markets at all times. The customer has
the right to ship over differential routes from refinery points, taking
the slower service at his own cost and risk of the market during
the transit period. If the quantity ths shipped is in fact incon-
siderable, it should' be iqnored rather than break down the, freiqht
applijation actually paid on the preponderating quantity of sugar.
If, however, sugar can be and is shipped by customers in this nianner
in sufficient quantity to break the tarket at the destination point
and to render it difficult for refiners to sell their own sugar on the
all-rail application, then the competition inust necessarily be oet.
It is a question of fact in every instance, and the Executive Secretary
should be fully advised, before sugar actually paying a higher rate
is sold on the differential rate, of the necessity of this departure
from the strict letter of the Code of Ethics." (Italics supplied)
In other words, the customer was to pay a freight application based upon
rail rates regardless of the mode of actual transportation, except where the
customer himself was able to take control of a barge shipment. During
open-water season large distributors could and did move considerable
sugar by barge. In view of this circumstance the provision, although
designed to restrain any disposition to give purchasers of sugar the
advantage of lower freight charges and to give the combination of
refiners a stronger position in the market than they could command in-
dividually, was inefficient in operation and broke down under the com-
petitive strain. The decree enjoined concerted action "determining trans-
portation charges or freight applications to be collected from customers,
or limiting freight absorption"; the defense waived its assignment of
error as to this point, but it was a focal point of argument throughout
the trial of the case, and of significance in explaining the real purpose
of the activities of the association in general. The purpose and effect
of the decree are to forbid any freight equalization agreement.
The defense of the code provision failed because, under the circum-
stances, the provision was equivalent to the fixing and, in a measure,
enhancing an important part of price. The justification based on a theory
of non-discrimination was patently feeble since the Sugar Institute rule
protected refiners' prices against the influence of actual transportation
costs, and the Institute's interpretation of its Code rule invited the re-
finers to ignore "discriminatory" situations until they interfered with
the uniform price structure. "Absorption", after all, is a direct vehicle
for price competition in a market where other elements of price are
more rigidly fixed; the evidence that the Institute's opposition to ab-
sorption was based on its interest in price uniformity damaged the
230 [Vol. 46: 228
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theory of fair trade on which the Institute laboriously founded its entire
case. As judge Mack said:4
"It is entirely clear that the discrimination involved in absorption did
not give defendants the least concern. Their whole purpose was to pre-
vent the breakdown of the freight structure, chiefly in the Great Lakes
and Warrior River areas."
The Robinson-Patman Act can hardly change the effect of the decree
as to this phase of the case. The Sugar Institute agreement governing
freight applications, while superficially addressed to the principle of
non-discriminatory prices which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act,
was obviously an attempt by the combination to insulate prices against
the influence of differences in the cost of transportation, an element
specifically excepted from the prohibition of Section 1 (a) of the Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act probably impinges on the practice of freight
charge absorption by an individual seller where it lessens, injures or
restrains competiti6n in addition to being discriminatory. Distinguishing
between forbidden discriminations which injure competition and proper
differences in prices of the individual seller promises to be the first of
the tremendous tasks imposed on the Federal Trade Commission and the
courts by the Robinson-Patman Act.5 In the offing lies the problem as
to how far a combination may utilize the prohibitions of the statute to
level out competition between members.
Since Code Section 3(c) was ineffective in practice, the rdfiners, turn-
ing to variants of the scheme, considered over a long period the idea of
delivered prices and of zoning and basing point systems. Counsel dis-
couraged an open agreement. But a dearly articulated system of basing
point pricing 'emerged from the constant cooperation of the Institute
membership. The trial court held that a finding that the system was
created concertedly, although justified, was not a prerequisite to holding
4. 15 F. Supp. 817, 845 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
5. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, unamended, like § 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act,
contained language to the effect that a discrimination to be unlawful must result in a
"substantial" lessening of competition. This phrase, found in three sections of the
Clayton Act (§§ 2, 3, 7) has been interpreted to require a showing of substantial injury to
competitive conditions in the industry as a whole. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922); Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.,
292 Fed. 720, 722 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923); Federal Trade Comm. v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,
5 F. (2d) 615, 622 (C. C.A. 2d, 1925), aff'd, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); cf. American Can
Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 48 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert. dcnied, 2M2 U.S.
899 (1931). In the Robinson-Patman Act, however, it is sufficent if the discrimination
results in competitive injury to an individual. It may be that this latter provision will
be effective to extend the ban upon price discriminations beyond the limits set by the
interpretations given to "substantial lessening of competition" as found in § 2 unamended,
although the terms of reference of that clause have never been tangibly bounded.
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the system illegal0 since it could, and did, find that the system was con-
certedly maintained. The defense bitterly disputed the contention that
such a plan was either so created or maintained. The scheme, applied
over limited periods in the two most competitive territories-the Great
Lakes and Mississippi Valley regions-provided for all-rail rates based
(as is customary in the trade) upon the refinery nearest freight-wise to
the customer, on all sugar regardless of the mode of actual transportation.
This was coupled with a refusal to sell f. o. b. refinery. The refiners
shipped much sugar by water and charged the rail rates, pocketing the
difference. On the other hand, the customers sought to divert the move-
ment of sugar from the waterways to the rails, since they paid for the
more rapid service anyway. Thus, savings that might be effected by
water shipment, ranging as high as twenty cents per hundred-pound bag
-more than the ordinaryr distributor's margin-were wiped out. Com-
plaints arose from the trade, from local chambers of commerce, and in
Congress.
The trial court had condemned the Institute's less drastic effort to
control the influence of freight rates on delivered prices, through Code
Section 3(c), as "unreasonable and therefore illegal"; thus both parts
of the scheme of freight equalization were outlawed as restraints of trade.7
In the .Supreme Court the defense expressly disregarded 8 its assignments
of error (Nos. 34, 35, 37) concerning the court's findings on Code 3 (c)
and the court's conclusions of law as to its illegality. The defense insisted
at great length, however, that the trial court had erred in its conclusions
on the facts in holding that the delivered-price system had been con-
certedly maintained, although the defense did not venture to urge the
legality of such a system. The Supreme Court discussed the procedural
and factual background of the case and concluded that the action taken
by the trial court should remain undisturbed.
The economics of the basing-point system have been belligerently dis-
puted.' Ideally, the competitive system should strike a balance in inter-
regional trade very much as it would in international trade. There being
no device for distant basing, a producer will naturally serve the territory
immediately surrounding his plant and will come into active competition
with his competitor at a point midway freight-wise. To the extent that
the local producer raises his price to take advantage of his local control
of the purchasing trade, he invites a competitor to invade and restrict
his territory. But inter-regional trade has been no more perfect than its
6. The trial court stated that there was sufficient evidence from which an "infer-
ence" that the system was concertedly created, could be drawn if necessary. United
States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 903 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
7. Ibid.
8. Brief for Appellants, 5-6.
9. See BURNrS, THE DECLINE OF COMePETITION (1936) 290; FETTER, THE MAS-
QUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 177, 240, 278, 292, 299, 332, 411, 463.
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analogue, international trade. Industries do not consistently grow up in
perfect economic relation to competitive points of production and to'the
purchasing markets. In reaching out for volume, competitors are power-
fully stimulated to absorb freight charges. Irregularity in the location of
points of production in relation to the markets pushes producers abroad.
Invasion invites counter-invasion, and by natural, if rough and approd-
mate, competitive processes, a system of basing price, upon other com-
panies' production points evolves without there necessarily being concert
of action. Thus for short periods individual price policies may approxi-
mate basing point results for an entire industry. But the case whqe
a seller refuses to use his own plant as a base for local sales is seldom
or never found in a competitive industry, and it is a fair inference
from industrial experience, as well as economic theory, that basing
point practices would not long survive unmodified in a market under
any kind of competitive pressure without concerted action among com-
petitors.
The steel industry, chief exponent of the basing-point system, has
defended it on a variety of grounds. Basing-point pricing increases
competition, it argues, and broadens purchasers' sources of supply; it
protects the property investment in a number of older centers such as
Pittsburgh and Youngstown, which might otherwise be at a serious dis-
advantage in competition. On the other hand, critics of the system point
out in the first place, that it is open to question whether there is any
advantage to purchasers in having available numerous sellers whose
prices are uniform and inflexible. But assuming there is some merit in
thus increasing the number of rival producers, the more important ques-
tion remains: Does it do this in a way which results in lower prices
to the consumers or merely in increased freight absorption and greater
waste of cross hauling, and also possibly of selling ex-pense?
It is generally admitted that the basing-point systems in use in many
industries involve both waste and discrimination. The purchaser near
a factory, but far from a basing point, is taxed by the practice to sub-
sidize the purchaser, perhaps his competitor, near to a basing point but
far from the factory; the seller located near a basing point is given a
gratuitous competitive advantage against more distant rivals; economic
waste is inevitable both in cross hauling and in the subsidy to higher-
cost producers, who would be at a disadvantage in a competitive market
either because of their location or their technical inefficiency.
The Sugar Institute case is the first, with the possible exception of the
Linseed Oil case, where a basing-point system or other freight equaliza-
tion plan maintained by agreement' 0 has been considered by the Supreme
10. In Maple Flooring Mfg'rs Assn. v. United States, 263 U. S. 563, 571 (1925),
and in Cement Mfg'rs v. United States, 26S U.S. SSS, 597 (1925) the Supreme Court
held that the systems were not arrived at by agreement.
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Court. While the zoning system in the Linseed case went down virtually
unnoticed with the remainder of the plan, in the Sugar Institute case the
delivered price plan could not-be ignored. Possibly because of the tactics
of the Institute in failing to argue the legality of the plan, the Supreme
Court left much unsaid on these issues; but by its approval of the result
reached by the trial court on this phase of the case, the state of the law
on these crucial issues is made clearer than in any previou case.
The Sugar Institute case was a prosecution under the Sherman Act
and hence the basing-point system in that case was attacked only insofar
as it was established or maintained by the concerted action of competitors.
The legality of the practice under Section 2 of the Clayton Act was not
involved. Thus, the Sugar Institute case, which goes far toward out-
lawing a basing-point plan. maintained by agreement, is not wholly re-
vealing as to the legality of a basing-point policy enforced entirely by
an individual seller. As a practical matter, however, few, if any, of the
basing-point systems presently in use by various industries, could be
maintained without a concert of activity. Under most industrial and
commercial circumstances, a basing-point plan is invariably an exercise
of monopolistic power, and is enforced, even where all the agreements
underlying it are tacit, by the threat of reprisals in the event of non-
compliance. But the Supreme Court's unwillingness hitherto to regard
dominant price-leadership as a form of monopolistic behavior11 has
left open the possibility that some basing-point systems may be con-
sidered by the court to be maintained individually. In this event such
a trade policy may be vulnerable under Sectioft 2 of the Clayton Act,
with or without the amendment provided by the Robinson-Patman Law.
The Robinson-Patman Act makes little, if any, change in the anti-
trust law as to basing-point systems. There was eliminated from the
House bill a definition of the word "price" designed to make illegal any
type of basing-point system and to require the f.o.b. method of sale.
It is evident from the House Committee Report that the Committee had
believed that this definition would end all doulbt regarding the validity
of a practice which it believed to be illegally discriminatory under ex-
isting law. The definition, however, was eliminated in response to ob-
jections that the subject was so complex and of such importance as to
require treatment in a separate act after more thorough investigation.
Whatever the significance of this elimination,n clearly it cannot be re-
garded as justifying the concerted maintenance of a basing-point system
contrary to the ruling in the Sugar Institute case. And it is unlikely that
11. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 449 (1920);
United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927).
12. See 80 CoNG. RRE. 8140, 8223, 8224 (1936). Compare, .however, Mennen Cp.
v. Federal Trade Comm., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759
(1923) with Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
[Vol. 46: 228
THE SUGAR INSTITUTE DECISIONS
the elimination of the provision will be interpreted as having any effect
on the validity of a basing-point system individually maintained. The
new Act probably leaves the law on individual maintenance of such a
system untouched also, unless perhaps the provision making price dis-
criminations unlawful not orily if they substantially lessen competition,
but also if they "injure, destroy or prevent competition -irth any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tions or wiih customers of either of them," is applied so as to make it
simpler to demonstrate the discriminatory character of the system.'
However, the difference between a lessening of competition generally
and an injury to a single competitor is not so dearly defined, nor so
tangible, as to support a difference of treatment in this situation, where
lessening of competition is as plain as injuries to individual competi-
tors, if the court is willing to face the economic facts.
The question whether a basing-point system, individually maintained,
was illegally discriminatory had not been passed upon by the Supreme
Court and was unsettled when Section 2 of the Clayton Act was
amended by passage of the Robinson-Patman Act.J4 The Federal Trade
Commission's Pittsburgh-Pls decision in 1924 is the only precedent on
the legality of such a system under Section 2 of the Clayton Act un-
amended." A meagre light was thrown on the Supreme Court's attitude
toward the problem in its decisions in the 41faple Flooring and Cement
cases. In those cases the court held that the systems were not arrived
at by agreement, and considered that issue the only one before it. The
Court did not comment on the validity of the systems as individually
maintained. Nevertheless, the Court's reference to particular factors
which might mitigate the discriminatory nature of a system was some-
what revealing on the extent to which the Court considered the systems
justified under the unamended Section 2 of the Clayton Act. Thus, in
the Maple Flooring case, the Court significantly noted that "the defend-
ants quote and sell on an f.o.b. mill basis whenever a purchaser so
requests," and that the freight rate "approximated closely to the actual
rate from their own mill towns".1 Likewise, in the Cement case, the
Court noted that "the freight rates . . . are compiled from the official
tariffs . . . The basing points are points of actual shipment."' 7
-13. § 1 (a). See also note 5, supra.
14. Former Federal Trade Commissioner Gaskldl who dissented in the Pitlsbargh-
Plus case has stated in his WuAT You AAY uD IT AY .Wo Do Uzmmn Tim NEawv Parcz
Drscu=NATIox LAW (1936) 34 that under the Robinson-Patman Act all basing-point
and delivered price systems are now subject to a cease and desist order if they either
directly or indirectly result in a price discrimination, unless the defendant can show
absence of illegal consequences.
15. In the Matter of United States Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924).
16. Maple Flooring Mfg'rs Ass'n v. United States, 263 U. S. 563, 571 (1925).
17. Cement Mfg'rs Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 5S8, 597 (1925).
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Although its decision was not based upon a violation of Secti6n 2
of the Clayton Act, the trial court in the Sugar Institute case indicated
its belief that the two plans used by the Sugar Institute were inherently
discriminatory. However, this belief was more emphatic in regard to
the second plan of all-rail delivered prices coupled with the refusal to
sell f.o.b. refinery than for the first plan, which did little more than
limit absorptions of freight charges.?
The system condemned by the Federal Trade Commission in the
Pittsburgh-Phs case was an extreme example of a system comparable
to the all-rail delivered price plan, coupled with refusal to sell f.o.b.
refinery, temporarily in effect in the sugar industry.'" The Commission
apparently has not seen fit to consider that the substitution by the Steel
Corporation of a multiple basing-point system for the condemned Pitts-
burgh-Plus has been in violation of its broad cease and desist order. It
should be noted, however, that the multiple basing-point system 6f the
steel industry has recently been criticized by the Commission, 0 which
took the position with regard to the N.R.A. Steel Code, that: "there
is no difference in principle between a single and multiple point system," 2 1
18. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 856 (1934).
19. In the Matter of United States Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924).
20. Report of the Federal Trade Commission to the President with respect to tile
basing-point system in the iron and steel industry, November 30, 1934.
21. A brief analysis of the practical operation of the multiple basing-point system,
which was substituted by the iron and steel industry for the original Pittsburgh-Plus
system condemned by the Commission, will throw into relief some of the objections.
Under the existing multiple basing-point system, there is one primary basing point,
which is Pittsburgh, with several other secondary or satellite basing points. When the
base price is fixed at Pittsburgh, the prices at all the other basing points are immediately
determined upon the basis of a fixed relation to the price at Pittsburgh. The relation
of each point, however, is governed by the addition of an arbitrary differential to the
Pittsburgh price. The differentials are not the same at all secondary basing points. The
following table, illustrative of these differentials, was compiled from current quotations:
SECONDARY BASING POINTS DIFFERENTIALS OVER PITTSBURGH
Birmingham .. ...... .$3.00 per ton
Chicago, or Gary ... . . . 1.00
Bethlehem . ....... . 2.00
Cleveland . ....... 1.00 to 3.00 per ton
Buffalo .. ........ 2.00 per ton
The Federal Trade Commission in the Pittsburgh-Phs case found that costs of pro-
duction at some of the secondary base points, such as Birmingham and Chicago, were
substantially lower than the costs at Pittsburgh; yet the base prices at Birmingham and
Chicago, since the substitution of the new pricing system for the one condemned by the
Commission, have consistently been higher than at Pittsburgh. This is an effective meth-
od of thwarting the operation of competitive economic forces.
Furthermore, a new facet of this problem is a form of regional discrimination which
directly affects industry in the regions working under the price disadvantages of the
system. When it is remembered that industries which achieve economies through pro-
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although it pointed out that the monopolistic results of basing-point
pricing were somewhat ameliorated by the use of a multiple point system.
The Commission was here dealing with a combination and was con-
demning the system as "price ffxing." While it did not specifically
refer to Section 2 of the Clayton Act, it emphasized the discriminatory
features of' the system similar to the features that had induced the con-
demnation of the Pittsburgh-Plus:'
"A fundamental objection to the basing-point system of fidng
prices is that such gifts of nature as the close proximity of iron ore,
coking coal, and fluxing stone in the Birmingham district supple-
mented by Government improvement of water transportation, are
withheld from the consumers by the producers to the latter's sole
benefit. One of the chief unnatural effects of the basing-point system
on consumers is its incidental requirement of the use of all rail trans-
portation charges" '2-
Boycott. Many refiners exercised a number of related business func-
tions. Thus, they and affiliated companies engaged in the production
of raws and in transportation, cooperage, syrup manufacture and alcohol
manufacture. The Institute did nothing to disturb these multiple activi-
ties. It did, however, devote zealous- attention to members of the dis-
tributing trade who performed more than one service. The Institute
by its Code condemned "the storage of sugar in warehouses in which
customers or brokers are interested, or with which they are in any way
affiliated." But this general disapproval of combined services was not
translated into oppressive form until May 2, 1929, when, after a special
meeting, the refiners wired their distributors as follows:
duction on a large scale are dependent upon a national and sometimes an international
market, it is not difficult to trace the effect of the regional discrimination involved at
this pricing system. For e.x-ample, the fabricator located at or near a secondary basing
point bearing a price differential over Pittsburgh, to the extent which he enters into
competition with similar fabricators who purchase their materials from Pittsburgh,
would have to absorb the price differential. Then, too, the manufacturer who further
converts semi-finished steel products into finished goods, which must be sold on a national
market, would always be confronted with this disadvantage. As a consequence, a pros-
pective manufacturer searching fdr a new industrial site to engage in a business which
uses rolled-steel products as the raw material, immediately realizes this unfavorable
situation and generally governs his choice of a factory location accordingly, which
means that he tries to locate at or near the primary base point.
22. 8 F.T.C. 1, 35 (1924).
23. Id. at 21.
24. The Commission left no ambiguity as to its condemnation of the system if main-
tained by concerted action:
"In economics, as in medicine, diagnosis is fundamental. The diagnosis
which the Commission makes is that the basing-point system not only per-
mits and encourages price fixing, but that it is price fixing."
1936]
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"Please advise us by wire whether you and your affiliated interests
desire to .deal with us either as broker, warehouseman or merchant.
Any position taken with us must be consistent with that taken by you
with any of our competitors."
Two days later the refiners followed up:
"Referring to our telegram of May 2 to which we have as yet
received no reply, please be advised that we cannot accept business
from any person, firm or corporation until their status as broker
exclusively, or as merchant exclusively, or as warehouseman ex-
clusively has been notified to us and satisfactorily established."
On May 7 the Institute informed each member of the "recommenda-
tion of the Enforcement Committee, that no business should be accepted
from any broker who had not signified his election to be exclusively
broker to the satisfaction of refiner," and that no further consignments
should be made to any warehouse affiliated with a broker "pending
complete severance of business." This remarkable plan, whereby the
producers coolly planned to reorganize the businesses of the distributors,
was rebuked by the courts, and the Institute was enjoined from:
"requiring or requesting any broker, warehouse, customer, carrier,
trucking concern, or any combination thereof, to elect to perform one
or more such distribution functions to the exclusion of others, or
to disdontinue or refrain from any distribution function or to dispose
of any business or property interest."
The theory of the defense reiterated the Institute's favorite slogans
of open prices and non-discrimination. The argument of the Institute
was that the distributors, except customers, were agents performing
functions for the refiners. By performing more than one functidn the
agent earned more than one fee. He was thus in a position to, and
frequently did, extend some secret concessions to his customers, thereby
reducing the ultimate market price of sugar. Brokers frequently were
in collusion with the customers, and where a broker controlled a ware-
house he could delay recording withdrawals from the warehouse so as
to give the customer the benefit of any lower price in the interim. More
easily, the customer who also maintained a warehouse was in a position
to withdraw the sugar at his own choice and later record the withdrawals
in such a manner as to give him a lower price or an unearned storage
fee. Paradoxically enough, the greatest source of secret concession was
the refiners' habit of paying customers for unearned storage of the
customers' own sughr. These practices obviously militated against higher
and uniform prices to the public.
The May 2 telegram, in the light of the actual subsequent enforcement
of the rule there laid down, is beggared for a parallel in anti-trust
[Vol. 46: 228
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history. "Trials," conducted, exclusively by the refiners, were held to
determine the existence of "affiliated interests"; a relationship between
different types of distributors to a stated degree of affinity or consanguin-
ity constituted an offense. Large and small, the efficient and the ineffi-
cient, the honest and the dishonest were forced to dismantle going bus-
inesses and dispose of properties in order to eliminate business habits
that led to price reductions. The effort of the Sugar Institute to segre-
gate the functions of brokers, dealers, and warehousemen involved the
simplest and most primitive kind of restraint of trade: a coercive exercise
of economic power for the purpose of protecting prices against the in-
fluence of competition.
Before the Robinson-Patman Act, there was no public policy against
such a combination of functions, and there is no extrinsic objection on
economic grounds to the performance of multiple functions by one
person. It was convenient and to a great extent customary in all phases
of the grocery industry. Many small concerns could not make a living
without performing more than one service. Some of the larger, over
a long period, had built up heavy investments in warehousing, trans-
portation and merchandising facilities. Many of these sugar distributors
were guilty of no irregularity or inefficiency. Conceding the combination
of functions to be particularly adapted to the fostering of unauthorized
concessions, there is reason to believe the concession system preferable
to a wasteful prohibition of combined functions, especially when en-
forced by boycott.
The trial court, though not unmindful of the problem of checking
unauthorized rebates concealed by the combination of functions, pointed
out that the refiners affected might have eliminated the irregularities
as to rebates and concessions by individually abandoning their own con-
cession habits and denied the Institute any power to require a reorgan-
ization of its customers' business. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's holding that the boycott was illegal, without commenting
on the marketing problem to which the boycott was addressed. Mean-
while the Robinson-Patman Act has come to the assistance of the indi-
vidual refiners by its prohibition of brokerage fees and allowances
granted or received in interstate commerce " . . . except for services
rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent,
representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect
control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom
such compensation is so granted or paid.-"2
25. Section 1(c). The prohibition against brokerage allowvances is not in terms
qualified by the necessity that a substantial lessening of competition or comp2tith-e
injury result in order that the practice be illegal See Tn- Roamso-PArMN2 T Acr
19361 239
240 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (Vol.46:228
Although the full import of this section of the statute cannot readily
be determined, it is evident that it was intended as an attack on the
practice of allowing brokerage discounts to customers who do not deal
through independent brokers,2 as is usually the case with the large chain
stores. The sponsors of the bill in Congress apparently regarded broker-
age fees in such circumstances as a major instrument for aggrandizing
the power of chain-store systems.27 The statute explicitly prohibits such
allowances, between buyer and seller only where no services are ren-
dered.28 It would be reasonable, therefore, to interpret the Act as requir-
ing in each case a demonstration that the buyer or his representative
contributed some service to the transaction beyond the act of purchase.
As a practical matter, of course, it would be difficult for the purchaser
to prove he has rendered the seller a service as broker, unless the phrase
"for services rendered" should be liberally interpreted to include any
savings in cost to the seller by reason 6f the elimination of independent
brokerage service. But it is not likely that the phrase will be so inter-
preted; and if the section is interpreted as its sponsors on the Judiciary
Committee intended, any allowance for brokerage to a buyer or to a
buyer-controlled broker in connection with the sale will be forbidden,
whether or not it can be proven that tangible services as a broker were
rendered. 9
(The vVashington Post, 1936) 35; GAsxILL, supra note 14, at 52. But the above quali-
fication may be read into this subsection, possibly in order to save it from attack on
grounds of constitutional invalidity. It could, moreover, be so interpreted in view of
the stated intention to prevent "oppressive discriminations." See H. REP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1936) 14.
26. Although the statute applies to brokerage paid to sellers as well as to buyers, we
shall discuss only brokerage paid by sellers to' buyers, the more important practice in
the sugar industry. The discussion applies, pari passu, however, to the reverse situation.
27. See Phillips, The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrininalion Law and the
Chain Store (1936) 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 62, 66.
28. There has been some disposition to read the statute as prohibiting all brokerage
allowances "except for services rendered," even where the allowance is granted to one
who is not affiliated with the buyer. [See THE Ronixso-,-PATrrA, Acr (The Washington
Post, 1936) 36; Legis. (1936) 50 HARv. L. R.y. 106, 113, n. 45. But cf. id. at 114, n. 47].
This interpretation requires an unintelligible construction of the Act: that in a sale by
A to B, it is illegal for A, the seller, to pay commissions to anyone except for services
rendered to B, the buyer. On the other hand, if it is correct, as suggested here, that the
Subsection applies only to the role of brokerage allowances in the relationship of seller
and buyer [and see, to that effect, speech of Chairman March of the Federal Trade
Commission, Drug Trade News, Sept. 28, 1936, p. 45, col. 5] the statute must be amended
to attain grammatical respectability, since it now declares it to be unlawful for any
person "to receive or accept (a commission) . . . to the other party" rather than
"from the other party."
29. See H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1936) 15, and the Confer-
ence Report, H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7, 15; and see Speech of
Congressman Utterbach, 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936). This interpretation appears ques-
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It is clear, however, that the amended Act does not prohibit combining.
the functions of broker and warehouseman and transportation company,
and the payment of compensation to such a combine for each type of
service is not affected by the statute. The Act was directed at the case
where a purchaser carries on these combined functions.
The Robinson-Patman Act does not specifically refer to discounts for
warehousing. However, both Sections 1(c) and 1(d) are broad enough
to cover them. But since such a fee can easily be shown to be pay-
ment "for services rendered," a purchaser-warehousenan should not have
the difficulty collecting fees for bona fide services even in connection
with deliveries to himself that a purchaser-broker will have under this
section. Section 1(d) was aimed at allowances to customers for adver-
tising, but its language is sweeping enough to forbid allowances to
customers for warehousing the stocks of the seller, unless the allowance
"is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers com-
peting . . " Bearing in mind the necessity for giving the statute a
reasonable construction, and avoiding questions of validity, it would
seem that a seller.may pay a customer for bona fide, independent ware-
housing facilities and services even though certain of the customers are
not equipped to furnish the type and quantity of facilities or services
required by the seller. Payment for faked services or facilities is the
chief aim of the Subsection, and insofar as it may cover warehousing
it can hardly be deemed to require that every purchaser, or none, shall
be accepted as a warehouseman. Where the prohibition is not in un-
ambiguous terms (as in the case of quantity discounts beyond limits
fixed by the Federal Trade Commission), the statute should not be
construed to forbid customary business transactions.30
As far as brokerage and warehousing habits in the sugar trade are
concerned, it thus seems fairly clear that independent broker-ware-
housemen, who are not purchasers, are unaffected by the new Act; but
purchasers who are also brokers, or who control brokers, while they need
not abandon their brokerage business, must probably give up claims to
tionable, however, in the light of the wording of the subsection. But the courts may
resort to Congressional history if they think that the statute is ambiguous.
In any event the problem will arise as to when a particular organization is so "con-
trolled" by a party to the transaction as to bring payment of brokerage within the pro-
hibition of the statute. It would appear that control in the sense of ability to formulate
and direct policies is sufficient and that complete or even substantial stock ownership is
not requisite.
30. Interpretations should be avoided which may lead to invalidation of the provi-
sions on the ground that "under the guise of protecting the public (they) arbitrarily
interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occup3tions or impose unreasonable
and unnecessary restrictions upon them." Cf. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S.
504, 513 (1924); Liggett Co. Y. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 113 (192s). See also Fair-
mont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 (1927).
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brokerage commissions on sales to themselves, thus 'fulfilling one 'of
the objectives of the Sugar Institute's boycott. However, the Act would
not, it seems, deprive purchasers who have warehouses of their com-
missions as bona fide warehousemen, as the Sugar Institute had aimed
to do.
Quantity Discounts and Other Allowances. A rule of the Sugar Insti-
tute's Code of Ethics condemned quantity discounts. The decree struck
at this rule by enjoining the Institute from preventing, restraining or
refusing to grant quantity or other discounts where such discounts reflect,
effect or result in economies to refiners, either in direct or indirect costs.
The sugar industry never had quantity discounts as such. To a great
extent discounts were secret, and varied not only with the quantity sold,
but with the size and trading ability of the buyer. Discounts were not
graded in definite ratio to quantity or to diminishing costs. In fact, the
trial court found quantity sales brought no appreciable savings to the
refiners in direct costs.3 ' However, in sales to those manufacturers and
distributors that can take deliveries of their sugar in carload lots direct
from the refinery, as many prefer instead of ex-consignment, there are
substantial savings in delivery, storage, bookkeeping, and other incidental
expenses. Large purchasers other than chain stores were more likely
to take deliveries in this way than small purchasers. It appears, however,
that no such savings would be effected in large sales to chain stores
because, in effect, the large sales in such cases usually amount, in view
of the method of taking delivery, to a series of small sales to the indi-
vidual stores in the chain.
On the question of indirect costs, the Court found that sales which
distribute production more evenly through the year effect substantial
savings to the refiners. The trial court also felt that the demand for
sugar was elastic and that quantity discounts might reasonably be ex-
pected in the long run to build up production and effect certain manu-
facturing economies incident to a larger scale of production. The defense
insisted that the only way in which the direct costs of making and
selling sugar could be reduced was by making deliveries in large lots,
so as to reduce handling costs ;8 such economies had nothing to do with
quantity purchases, which often required delivery in small lots. It urged
that whatever decrease in costs was incident to. producing an increased
volume should be apportioned to all of the refiners' purchases rather
than to the large, ones, and emphasized that the same result could be
accomplished by an accumulation of small orders. Their approach was
not accepted.
31. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 868 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
32. Brief for Appellants 108.
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In evaluating the ruling of the courts on this question, it is important
to note the limited scope of the decree itself, which enjoins the Sugar
Institute from requiring its members to refuse to grant discounts in
cases where such discounts -eflect, effect or resdt in economies. The
canons used by the courts in the Sugar Institute case for judging the
propriety of discounts are in general concerned with costs, and with the
relation between prices and the quantity demanded. The courts favored
a price policy which led to an increased volume of sales, assuming that
such aft increase in volume involved savings in unit cost, either directly
or indirectly, and they frowned on restraints which attempted to frustrate
this increase in the physical output of sugar by preventing price cuts via
discounts. The language of the decree in the Sugar Institute case seems
to imply that there are situations where the trade association might per-
missibly limit the discount practices of its members. However, when
the injunction itself is coupled with the finding of the court as to elas-
ticity of the demand for sugar and the savings effected by quantity sales,
the sugar industry can hardly hope itself to avoid the impact of the
court order by rewording its discount rules. As to the significance of
this provision of the decree to other industries, it may be noted that a
few industries may show an inability to decrease costs with increasing
demand and on that basis assert the right to restrict quantity discounts.
But producers of specialties or proprietary articles, and public utilities,
industries where, as price goes down, demand increases and unit costs
are lowered, would have even less justification than the sugar refiners
for eliminating quantity discounts.
The decree apparently did not deny the Sugar Institute power to
restrain its members from some discount practices not dearly in viola-
tion of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as the law then stood. For example,
while it denied to the combination the right to ban all quantityfdiscounts,
it left it free to eliminate discounts based purely on quantity with no
relation to cost savings or purely on the trade status of purchasers (of
wholesalers, retailers, chain stores, etc.) where no economies were re-
flected, although such discounts granted by individuals were apparently
legal under the Clayton Act prior to the Robinson-Pattnan Amendment. 3
33. In Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 283 Fed. 774 (C. C.A. 2d, 1923),
cert. denzied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923), a sales policy which involved classification of the
trade into wholesalers and retailers and the allowance of a greater discount to the
former was held not to violate § 2 of the Clayton Act unamended. The Supreme Court
in Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929), disapproved part
of the reasoning of the Court in the Mennen case. But see as tending to support the
Mennen case, S. S. Ktesge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C.A.
6th, 1925); National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 299 Fed. 733 (CC. A. 2d,
1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924) ; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream
of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C.A. 2d, 1915). See also Comment (1929) 42 HM.v.
L. RE v. 680, 683.
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In permitting the Institute to restrain discounts which were not illegal
under the Clayton Act, the Court made an unusual concession to the
freedom of a trade association to frame rules for its trade, a concession
which seems mainly directed to the problem of chain store marketing.
Chain stores habitually take deliveries of sugar in small quantities drawn
from local consignment, a practice more costly than car-load deliveries
in delivery, storage, bookkeeping and other incidental expenses. Refiners
contended that these expenses offset the more theoretical savings in
indirect costs incident to sales of large quantities. To justify the elim-
ination of the quantity discount, they argued that under such circum-
stances fixed quantity discounts to chain stores are concessions to eco-
nomic power, not responses of price to reductions in cost.
3 4
Insofar-as the decree in the Sugar Institute case permitted the Insti-
tute to bar discounts which did not correspond to economies of manu-
facture or distribution, it anticipated the policy of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The Act excepts from its catalogue of prohibited price discrim-
inations15 "differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are . . . sold or
delivered." This permissive allowance of discounts, which correspond
to cost differentials (saving, for the time being, the problem of measuring
and allocating costs) is qualified by the power given the Federal Trade
Commission, to limit the price advantages which can be given a purchaser
of large quantities. Where the Commission finds, after hearing all inter-
ested parties, that there are so few large scale purchasers that quantity
discounts would give them an advantage in competition which the Com-
mission considers "unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly
in any line of commerce", it is authorized to fix "quantity limits", and
quantity discounts in excess of those limits are made unlawful.30
34. Query the legality under § 1 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act of allowing a
discount on a quantity basis, for such purchases. It may be urged either that an
arrangement of this character is merely a subterfuge to gain a quantity discount on
what are in reality small orders, especially if payment for the sugar is staggered, or
that there are present no "difference(s) in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery"
for which "due allowance" may be made. In addition, this practice of wareh6using
the sugar for some buyers may come within the ban of § 1(e) of the Act as a
"service or facility" not accorded all purchasers; and from another aspect, such prac-
tices may bring the parties within the provisions of § 3 of the Act and make them
subject to its criminal sanctions for granting or receiving a "rebate" that is not avail-
able to competitors of the buyer.
An analogous problem arises in connection vith the granting of quantity discounts
on a cumulative basis, that is, all purchases for the month or year as the case may
be are totaled and the discount allowed accordingly. The difficultl of proving a savings
in cpst in such cases is obvious.
35. See note 37, infra.
36. Section l(a). Some commentators reject this interpretation, contending that the
Commission is not under this clause authorized to fix the amount of the discount "but
(Vol. 46: 22S244
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The test for the legality of a discount, otherwise within the prohibi-
tion of Section 1(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,37 is one of costs:
discounts are legal if they make "only due allowance" for economies
"in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery" which are associated with
the reason for the discount. If discounts discriminating among pur-
chasers on the basis of trade status are considered to restrain or injure
competition, they vill have to be examined in the light of a cost analysis.Ps
merely the quantity limit to which such discount may be applicable." See Tim Ronu:son-
PATIMAx AcT (The Washington Post, 1936) 29.
37. In order for the ban of § 1(a) of the Act to be applicable to a discrimination,
three elements must concur: (a) a sale and purchase of a commodity in commerce;
(b) discrimination in price "either directly or indirectly"; (c) "where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination
or with the customers of either of them."
The above strictures should, however, be qualified on two points: (a) the burden
of proof, in the sense of showing no sufficient effect on commerce, etc., is by § 1(b)
placed on the defendant and the government apparently need not'prove the presence
of the requisite effect on commerce or competition to establish a prima fade case at
least before the Commission; (b) discounts which may be justified under the provisos
of the Act, such as arising from "differences in cost, etc.", are clearly legal irrespective
of any question of their effect on commerce.
38. Some commentators contend that such discounts are not within the prohibition
of § 1(a) because they do not "substantially lessen competition" or "injure, destroy, or
prevent" it on the ground that there is no competition between purchasers of different
status. See Gordon, The Meaing of Sections r and 3 of the Robinson-Patmian Anti-
Discrimination Act (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 593. They point to the cases which under § 2
of the Clayton Act unamended apparently upheld the legality of functional classification
(see note 33 supra) and contend that these are applicable to § 2 as now amended. But
§ 2 of the Clayton Act now outlaws discounts which result merely in individual competi-
tive injury as distinguished from the injury to competitive conditions in the trade as a
whole, which was requisite to holding discounts illegal under § 2 as unamended. And
in further defense of the view that discounts based on trade status can bring about an
injury to competition, it is contended that there is competition between chain stores and
wholesalers, and that to grant a discount to a wholesaler merely on the basis of his
status may be effective to "injure, destroy or prevent competition" between the two, and
is therefore illegal, unless justifiable as based on a difference in the cost of sales; and
further, as a matter of congressional intent, that a provision specifically permitting such
discounts was eliminated during the passage of the Act. See 80 Colio. Rc. 8113, S114
(1936) ; SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., (1936) 1, 5. See also GAsnaM, supra
note 14, at 30. This construction, requiring the showing of an injury to competition as
ground for an attack on trade status discounts, is supported by the Federal Trade
Commission's attitude in its complaint against the United States Quarry Tile Co.
[(1936) 4 U.S. LAw W=mc 177]. There, it was alleged (par. 3 of the complaint) the
defendant company discriminated in the price of its product between contractors and
"wholesalers.' It is pointed out that the "so-called wholesalers are in fact retailers in
that they resell said tile to the ultimate consumer" and are, therefore, in direct com-
petition with the contractor, so that granting to the wholesaler a discount denied to the
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The Robinson-Patman Act apparently adopts the conclusion of the Federal
Trade Commission in the Goodyear Tire case, which had been seriously
questioned as an interpretation of the unamended Clayton Act, that a
difference in price is forbidden "unless it is based on a difference in' cost
. . . and reasonably related to and approximately no more than the dif-
ference in cost." It is not clear how exact the calculation of economies
in costs must be under the new statute, and whether the Act includes what
Judge Mack in the Sugar Istitute case called "indirect" costs in the cate-
gory of costs "of manufacture, sale, or delivery". The statute does require
some kind of demonstrable correspondence between cost and discount.
Of course, as the Commission remarked in the Goodyear case, "the
problem is a practical one . . . [and] a discount is not to be condemned
merely because it does not mathematically accord with cost differences" ;30
on the other hand, there will undoubtedly be a tendency, in administering
the new Act, to ignore economies which seem remote or speculative,
especially since the statute places the burden of justifying all discrimina-
tions in price on the person -charged with violating the Act.4" The atti-
tude of the Commission in the Goodyear case indicates that it may be
difficult to establish that a sale to a customer who has been given a
discount involves an economy in indirect costs. The Act will inevitably
involve the Commission in a tedious routine of cost analysis whose results
will necessarily be only approximate. There is danger that real, though
intangible, economies will be classified as remote and speculative, and
that the consuming public will thereby be deprived of justified price cvts.
The warnings that the Act is susceptible of such interpretation can hardly
be ignored.despite the assurances of the House Judiciary Committee that:
"Any physical economies that are to be found in mass buying and
distribution, whether by corporate chain, voluntary chain, mail-order
house, department store, or by the cooperative grouping of producers,
wholesalers, retailers, or distributors-and whether those economies
are from more orderly processes of manufacture, or from the elim-
ination of unnecessary salesmen, unnecessary travel expense, unnec-
essary warehousing, unnecessary truck or other forms of delivery,
or other such causes-none of them are in the- remotest degree dis-
turbed by this bill."
The new Act fails to distinguish between markets in which there are
many competitors and markets in which there are few competitors, and
contractor injures competition between them, a fact which is alleged to make the dis-
count illegal unless justified by a savings in cost.
39. On the Goodyear case generally, see George, The Federal Trade Contnlission
Decision in the Goodyear Case (April, May and June, 1936) THE DUN AND BRADsT EET
MONTHLY REVIEW.
40. Section 1 (b).
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on this ground is open to serious objections of economic policy, if its
prohibition of discriminations is applied in situations where the prices
preserved by the Act against the raids of large purchasers are mono-
polistic prices. The Act ignores the possibility that it may be in the
public interest, where monopolistic price-formation is inevitable, to en-
courage price discrimination.' It is evident that cautious administrative
and judicial interpretation of the Act is essential t6 insure that the lesser
evils of price discrimination are not eliminated to enhance the greater
evils of fortified monopoly.
But whatever the policy of the new Act with respect to price discrimina-
tions and trade discounts, its enforcement is entrusted to the Federal
Trade Commission and the courts, and not to the autonomous action
of business men grouped in trade associations. The most significant
holding of the Sugar Institute case was that restraints of trade could not
be justified as an attempt to eliminate price discrimination, that is, to
enforce Section 2 of the Clayton Act. It may be expected that the courts
will view with at least an equal skepticism trade association rules sup-
ported in the name of the non-discrimination policy of the Robinson-
Patman Act, a statute broader in scope than the original Section 2 of
the Clayton Act, dependent for enforcement on extensive factual in-
vestigation, and concededly susceptible to misuse for monopolistic pur-
poses. Although, in the Appalachian Coals*2 and the Sugar Institute
cases, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to uphold trade asso-
ciatioht rules insofar as they restrained acts then illegal, and perhaps
some trade practices not illegal but merely inconvenient, it is extremely
doubtful that the courts will hold that a trade association has powers
of self-regulation coextensive with the broad and unexplored implica-
tions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Whatever the complexities of the Act, it is clear that it was not in-
tended to promote price fixing or other monopolistic activities. Current
comments on the Robinson-Patman Act, attempt to stretch Section 1(a)
to extreme lengths. It is contended that not only must prices be uniform,
even to the extent of eliminating all discounts, but that open price sys-
tems, future price reporting and waiting periods are now required in
the interests of equal treatment for all customers.4 3 Such opinions may
41. See Fly, supra note 1, at 1347; p. 254 infra.
42. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 283 U. S. 344 (1933).
43. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 594, 593; minority report of Congressman Celler
of Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. REP. 2287, PL 2, 74th Cong., 2d Ses. (1936) 13;
cf. GAsHILr, supra note 14, at 36; 48 Aizxmsr 213 (August 14, 1936). The sponsors
of the bill repeatedly and vehemently disavowed that the amendment was intended or
would have any such effects. Thus in the conclusion of the House Committee Report,
Congressman Utterback, undertaking "to correct some important misapprehensions, and
even misrepresentations," stated: "There is nothing in it (the Bill) to fi=x prices, or
1936]
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fairly be classified as wishful thinking. No bona fide effort to comply
with the amended Act and with the other anti-trust laws can include
such price fixing schemes.
Consignment Points. Prior to .1925 refiners maintained warehouse
stocks chiefly in a few important terminal or junction points for reship-
ment on short notice to fAearby markets, and, secondarily, for distribu-
tion to the local trade. By 1927 consignment points utilized by one or
more refiners had increased to the hundreds. The Institute eliminated
a great many of these points and the decree enjoined such Institute
action.
This phase of the case shifted the general emphasis from the Insti-
tute's favorite theme of open prices and non-discrimination to the pro-
position that the maintenance of these local stocks in such vast number
was economic waste. The slight advantage to a refiner in increasing
his local trade by the maintenance of local stocks ready for delivery, in
small as well as large quantities, was of sufficient weight to incline one
refiner to trail the other in establishing new storage points. Undoubtedly
the increase in the number of these points had a spiral movement, and
many of the points, although benefitting and conveniencing the local
trade, could hardly be deemed essential to efficient, economical distri-
enable the fixation of prices; nor to limit the freedom of price movements in response
to changing market conditions." Said Congressman Patman: "The bill is opposed to
price fixing." 80 CONG. REc. 7760 (1936). See also 80 CoNG. REc. 3116, 6286 (1936).
In regard to waiting periods, Congressman Patman said: "Prices may be changed
as at present except prices shall not be changed for the sole and only purpose of grant-
ing a special favor or benefit to a favorite customer. A bona fide price may be changed
at any time." 80 CONG. REc. 7761 (1936). "There is nothing in the bill that will hinder
a man changing his price every day and every hour if his purpose is not to discriminate
against a competitor." 80 CoNG. REC. 8231 (1936).
In this connection, some of the language of § 1 (b) must be considered here, namely
that, "nothing herein contained (the placing of the burden of proof on the alleged violator)
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing that his
lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet the equally low price of a com-
petitor, . . !' This replaces analogous language in old § 2 of the Clayton Act which
provided that "nothing herein contained (§2) shall prevent discrimination in price in
the same or different communities made in good faith to mebt competition." Obviously,
a statute containing a provision of the latter character cannot be said to encourage price
uniformity, especially in view of the fact that in actual operation this provision robbed
the statute of any effectiveness, because discriminations (discounts) could be so easily
justified. See Conference Report, H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936).
Hence, if the above-quoted provision of the Robinson-Patman Act has a like effect, any
claim that the Act will result in price uniformity is entirely unfounded; however, there
can be no doubt but that it was intended to have a much narrower scope and designed
merely as a "procedural" rule of evidence. It was pointed out that meeting competition
is "not set up . . . as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under-the Act'
In each case, it is "a question of fact . . . whether the competition to be met was
such as to justify the discrimination given, as one lying within the -limitations laid down
by the bill . . . " (id. at 7).
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bution. There was no apparent way to end the practice without concert
of action. Individual action in attempting to restrict the number of points
was ineffective in the face of competitive pressure to increase them.
The refiners insisted that they were thus performing storage functions
that the distributors ought to furnish for themselves, and were merely
rewarding loose methods involved in the distributors' failure to plan and
provide for the needs of their customers a brief time in advance. They
complained of the Court's holding that fixing the consignment service
charge was a restraint of trade while, at the same time, deciding that the
elimination of the points was injurious to the trade, thus dipping the
restraint on consignments at both ends. Perhaps the Court felt, in the
mood of the Trenton Potteries case, that the fixing of a fair price for
a beneficial service may itself be illegal.
There were a number of considerations involved in the conclusion of
the trial court against the Institute's elimination of consignment points.
One result of the Institutes move was to slam the door of opportunity
in the face of the desk jobber, a man who had no greater wholesale
establishment than a desk and a place to hang his hat and who was
dependent upon these local storage stocks for his deliveries to the retail
stores. Discrimination between localities was another consequence of
the restraint. A city which has the stocks in storage for ready distri-
bution may attract trade at the expense of neighboring cities without
such stocks. While there were generally no substantial delays in the
deliveries of sugar from refinery or central points, the existence of local
stocks made them readily available to the local trade. Certain smaller
distributors asserted an advantage in being able to procure a complete
assortment of sugars without the risk of making commitments. The
smaller distributor with little storage facilities of his own was favored,
while at the same time the chain stores fell back upon this device by
taking dribbling deliveries from day to day on their large purchase
contracts. The distributor frequently avoided the purchase of carload
lots, with its greater investment in sugar and in warehouse facilities,
extensive storage, and the risk of deterioration--which is a considerable
item in the sugar industry-by reliance upon the refiners' consignment
points.
Long-termn Contracts. The Court found that the Institute eliminated
the sale of sugar on long-term contracts and condemned this action as
an unreasonable restraint of trade.
A few such contracts assumed importance in the trade because of the
peculiar structure of the sugar market. The average purchaser takes
about a month's supply of sugar. The usual form of contract calls for
delivery within thirty days. Price change announcements usually pro-
voke sugar moves during the course of the month. However, prices in
the sugar industry are of such a sensitive character, that a purchaser
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who can contract for sugar months in advance may be receiving and
selling sugar at other than the going price at the time of delivery. This
of course disturbs the market and throws a strain on the price system.
There was thus not only a7 lowering of prices to the public in specific
instances but also a tendency toward lower prices generally. Although
there was substantial testimony to show a concerted elimination of long-
term contracts, the defense urged that the finding was erroneous and
that the industry would in fact be satisfied with open prices available
to all.44 The court concluded as a matter of law that eliminating this
form of contract restricted the commercial freedom of the refiners and
contributed to preventing competitive fluctuations of price. The finding
of fact itself was of greater significance as added evidence that the
Institute's professed antagonism to discriminatory trade practices was
a cloak for its concerted efforts to guard a price level.
Miscellaneous Restraints. Tolling contracts, under which the purchaser
furnishes the raws and pays a service charge for the refining service,
were restrained by the Institute, and the restraints were condemned. Again
it was clear that the Institute's theory of non-discrimination was irrele-
vant and that the actual aim was the elimination of a minor impediment
to uniformity of price.
45
- The Institute forbade the acceptance of used bags returned by the
customers. One customer, by quickly and carefully handling the com-
modity, preserving the bag and returning it, Would reduce the cost of
bags from 15 cents to a fraction of that amount. This item would run
into thousands of dollars for a single purchaser. On the other hand,
a number of the customers so used the bags that they were not fit for
refilling. Thus, while there were distinct economies in permitting the
re-use of bags, the system of allowances for used bag returns could be
used by the refiner to grant a secret discount on a return of worthless
bags. The restraint struck both the economic practice and the discrim-
inatory one. Again the courts felt that the restraint had gone too far.
40
The Institute adopted various rules having to do with transiting and
diversion, water carriers, private charters, pool cars, and pool cargoes
44. Brief for kppellants 172."
45. It should be noted in passing that uniformity of price on standardized articles
sold under similar conditions is compatible with the existence of free competition.
Analysis should emphasize the standardization of the commodity sold, and the com-
petitive structure of the market [cf. p. 254 infra] in which it was sold. Price uniformity
at the market does not require a uniformity of delivered prices. Farimi, supra note 9,
at 333. At the trial the defense frequently urged that discrimination was involved
wherever some purchasers lacked the facilities to enable them to take advantage of
some normal service or mode of sale or delivery.
46. This practice if it is available to one purchaser and not to another may under
§3 of the Robinson-Patman Act be held a rebate and subject the seller to criminal
penalties, or to a cease and desist order if held violative of either § 1 (a) or § 1 (e).
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and trucking. Most of them were disapproved, although largely of a
regulatory and, to a certain extent, wholesome character, as generally
tending to interfere with the business of third parties and the unrestricted
flow of traffic. The fact of these minor trade rules of the Sugar Insti-
tute is intelligible only insofar as they were part of a comprehensive
plan condemned in its general phases as an illegal restraint of trade.
In another case, it may be, the courts will take a more cooperative atti-
tude where an-industry seeks to eliminate small and genuinely annoying
competitive practices.
General Purposes and Good Faith. The Institute defended itself
vigorously on grounds of its good faith. The district court, however,
devoted itself primarily to an analysis of economic consequences of the
Institute's practices. Based upon this study, it found that the purposes
of the defendants in organizing and maintaining the Institute were: 7T
"To create and maintain a uniform price structure, thereby elim-
inating and suppressing price competition among themselves and
other competitors; to maintain relatively high prices for refined, as
compared with contemporary prices of raw sugar."
This approach was in accord with a consistent line of decisions to
the effect that good intentions and perhaps some good results will not
justify substantial restraints.4 8 Actual intent will not be ignored by the
Court where the effect of an agreement is not manifest, or where conduct
is equivocal, since it may be helpful in "the interpretation of facts and
the prediction of consequences." 40 But this was one of the cases where
the effects were apparent; stated intentions were regarded merely as
"pious protestations and smug preambles" which intensified "distrust." .
But the defense argued eloquently and at length that the purposes
of the Institute were to avoid discriminations, to make all prices public,
and to eliminate waste; and it paraded many imposing personages in
the sugar industry to testify that stabilization of prices and enhance-
47. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 890 (S. D. N.Y. 1934).
43. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 165 U. S. 290, 341 (197);
.Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49 (1912); United States
v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61, 93 (1912); United States v Reading Co., 226
U. S. 324, 370 (1912); Thompson v. Cayser, 243 U.-S. 66, 85 (1917); Paramount
Famous Players Lasky Corp. v. United States, 232 U. S. 30 (1930); United States
v. First National Pictures, Inc., 2S2 U. S. 44 (1930).
49. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 397 (1905); United States v.
Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61 (1912); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U. S. 231 (1913); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 28S U. S. 344, 372
(1933).
50. Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Maple Flioring Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 587 (1925); Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of
Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 559 (1930).
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ment of refiners' profits were negligible motives in comparison to the
Sugar Institute's interest in spreading information, publishing prices,
and preventing discriminations. They referred to the conferences which
the organizers of the Institute had with the Department of Justice, and
the Department's assistance in drafting the code, as further evidence
of their intention not to restrain trade.
The emphasis placed by the defense on its relations with the Govern-
ment, at the time of organizing the Institute, is -of particular interest
because of its practical importance in the future administration of the
law. This is what happened: At the outset, the industry submitted its
code to the Attorney General, who advised them that he saw "no basis
which would require the institution of proceedings". Immediately cer-
tain members of the industry publicly described this as an "approval".
The Attorney General pointedly corrected the statement, writing them
that he had no authority to approve the plan. The Department reserved
full right to proceed in court. Later the same Attorney General became
doubtful as to the legality of phases of the plan. The succeeding
Attorney General believed the plan illegal from the beginning and, after
viewing it in actual operation and receiving complaints from injured
parties, began an action to enjoin operations. In court the industry per-
sistently claimed government approval as bearing upon its good faith,
urging that it had not gone beyond the "approved" plan. The trial court
not only found that the industry had not informed the Government of
some of the restraints actually imposed, but also that much of the original
code itself was bad. The Supreme Court's view was in accord. Such a
record indicates the practical difficulties involved in the comment on
abstract plans by the prosecuting agency, whose primary function is
on the public side of the controversies so frequently arising from such
plans. It is clear that qualifications expressed by the Department of
Justice in its comment on a plan will be ignored by industry.5 ' The em-
barrassment of such action by the prosecuting agency is substantial, and
the danger that the tentative opinion of the Department may have an
undue persuasive influence on the courts is greater than the results of
the Sugar Institute case indicate.52 Many business men would like some
form of declaratory judgment in these cases to inform them in advance
51. In this connection see the Federal Trade Commission Trade Practice Conference,
Rules for the Petroleum Industry and the decree in the United States v. Standard Oil
Co. of Calif. et. al., N. D. Calif. Sept. 15, 1930; as to the Paramount case and the
situation more generally, see Montague, Proposals for the Revision of the Anti-Trust
Laws (1932) SYMPOSIUM ON THE FEDEu~. ANTI-TRUsT LAWS, C. C. H. 23, 29.
52. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920); United
States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214, 239 (1922); United States v. General
Elec. Co., 15 F. (2d) 715 (N. D. Ohio 1925), aff'd., 272 U. S. 476 (1926); Legis.
(1932) 45 HAv. L. REv. 566, 570.
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as to the legality of their plans of combination. But abstract plans are
not always identical with actual operations. And a judgment as to the
legality of a trade association plan requires a careful consideration of
many detailed facts as well as a prophetic vision as to its actual effect
on commerce. There is no simple test of legality under the anti-trust
laws; s3 the courts view a trade practice suspected of illegality as best
they can in terms of its facts, appraise what seem to be its economic
consequences, consider the convenience and ordinary routine of trade,
and decide the issue without recourse to clear standards, or simple tests.
The history of the Sugar Institute and its relations with the Department
of Justice illustrates the danger of official opinions in advance of the
trade's actual experience with its association's plan.
This brief inquiry into the activities of the Sugar Institute, against
their business background, and against the background of statutory and
non-statutory law of restraint of trade, suggests several of the crucial
weaknesses of the anti-trust laws. The laws to protect competition have
never been considered by Congress as an organic whole, designed to
53. In this connection a word of warning should be recorded concerning the growing
assumption that the courts apply a price-fixing test in determining the legality of trade
agreements. See Kirsch, TRADE AssocrATioNs, Tnxm LEGAL. Asrzcrs (1923) IS5;
Handler, The Sugar Institute Case and the Present Status of the Anti-Tnrst Laws
(1936) 36 COL L. REv. 1, 5; cf. Jaffe and Tobriner, The Lcgality of Price-Fixing
Agreements (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1164. This tendency is due to the fact that the
term "price fixing" has been loosely used to include agreements impeding price com-
petition or fixing individual elements of ultimate price. There has been such a general
failure to describe restraints precisely that the danger has arisen that important
restraints of trade may be overlooked by reason of the emphasis on price fixing. The
importance of the Sugar Institte case in clarifying this point should not go unnoticed.
Prior to the Institute, list prices of sugar were substantially uniform, and there
were only moderate variations in the actual selling prices of the different refiners. After
the Institute, prices were in fact uniform and were sufficiently higher "to negate the
inference of free competition." The Court concluded that the dominant purposes in-
cluded the maintenance of a relatively high uniform price structure. Neither court
felt that the basic price was fixed concertedly [56 Sup. Ct. 629, 634 (1936); 15 F.
Supp. 317, 890 (S.D. N.Y. 1934)] and both agreed that there was substantial com-
petition upon the basic price itself. Nevertheless, the Court condemned a number of
agreements bearing upon various phases of the price structure but individually and
collectively falling short of an express or implied agreement to fix the price of sugar.
It is thus apparent that restraints of trade may be illegal for their effect on pro-
duction, or territory, or the status of distributors, or transportation routes, or the
shifting of trade from one vicinity to another-all without being substantially equivalent
to price fixing. Future price reporting, with an agreement not to deviate, may be
illegal, indeed, because of its effect on prices, and yet fall far short of price fixing. Re-
straints may be illegal because of their influence on the profit level without even affect-
ing price. The assumption that price fixing is a necessary term of an illegal restraint
seems to lead only to confusion; there is nothing to be gained in analysis or prediction
by such an attempt to simplify the test of legality.
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implement a clearly formulated policy. They have grown up piecemeal,
concrete as to practices which touched the imagination of Congress as
dangerous, or pressed hard on the tods of a potent pressure group; but
vague in great areas where successful administration is impossible with-
out more explicit standards. While courts sympathetic to the purposes .of
anti-trust legislation might have made the present anti-trust laws more
effective, the statutes have had a long and familiar history of judicial
emasculation; it is now clear that progress depends on statutory change,
and not on growth within the Rule of Reason.
The history of the Sugar Institute, 4 and a view of' its operation,
dramatize several issues which should be basic elements in an anti-trust
policy. The first is the importance of the market structure within which
a suspected violation of the anti-trust laws takes place. The economic
results of trade association practices are different in a market of few
sellers than in a market of many sellers, and the statutes should be
framed to recognize differences of policy appropriate to the differences
between perfect and monopolistic competition. Thus, a trade practice,
like price discrimination, may represent a monopolistic tendency in a
market which is in the main open, or a competitive influence oft the
restrictive policy of a more fully monopolized market; the anti-trust laws
treat the two situations identically. Another issue, the importance of
which has been greatly increased by the passage of the Robinson-Patman
Act, concerns the right of a combination to restrain activities which may
be illegally discriminatory. In view of the scope of the Act, the limita-
tions on the powers of trade associations in this respect need express
clarification; and Congress may well undertake to set legal boundaries
for the several more significant trade association activities. And finally
legislative safeguards are needed to insure that the application of the
.anti-trust laws to trade associations does not go the way of the merger
cases. This can best be effected, of course, by legislation remedying the
notorious failure of the anti-trust laws to preTent monopolistic mergers.
Pending the enactment of effective legislation, the Sugar Institute case
may well be used as the basis for an intelligent adaptation of the anti-
trust laws to the economic problems of collective action by business
groups. Aside from a somewhat dubious treatment by the Supreme Court
of one aspect of the Sugar Institute's information service, and a failure
adequately to articulate first principles the Sugar Institute case is the best
available guide to the anti-trust laws, and the most comprehensive-and
most useful-collection of legal and factual materials in the field. Al-
though the case may not require the trust laws to grow along the lines
indicated above, it will not preveht such a growth, and in many. ways
looks forward to one.
54. With the dosing of the Institute, this history has ended. N. Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1936, p..39, col. 5.
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